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    <title>Defense-in-Depth on Aleph Beth</title>
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      <title>The Hidden Weapon in the Page</title>
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      <description>An indexed web page can carry a natural-language payload that targets, in a few lines, all four defensive layers of an AI agent: evasion, persistence, exfiltration, concealment. Worse, the outbound channel used for exfiltration is bidirectional: behind the URL, an attacker talks to the agent in real time. This article details the mechanism, shows why warning the model is a necessary but never sufficient first line, and why security comes from architecture — not from the prompt.</description>
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      <title>The Instruction That Protects Nothing: Why Prompt Position and Fine-Tuning Never Validate an LLM</title>
      <link>https://www.alephbeth.ai/posts/2026-06-29-prompt-position-fine-tuning-never-validate/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>A stubborn intuition holds that you only need to put the safety rules &amp;lsquo;first&amp;rsquo; in the system prompt. It is false, and for a reason that turns against it: a transformer grants no authority to a token&amp;rsquo;s position. Fine-tuning fails exactly the same test. Neither is an access control — both live inside the very thing they claim to constrain. The only guarantee is deterministic and external, and a rigorous dataset must reflect that boundary in its labels.</description>
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