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    <title>Indirect-Injection on Aleph Beth</title>
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      <title>When the Web Becomes a Weapon: Understanding Attacks Against AI Agents</title>
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      <description>All it takes to hijack an AI agent is for it to visit a web page carrying invisible instructions. This article walks through the full attack chain — indirect prompt injection observed in the wild, persistence through memory and RAG poisoning, state-level redirection of agent searches — then turns the weapon around: reverse-injection honeypots, tarpits and trap functions that expose attacking agents.</description>
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      <title>The Hidden Weapon in the Page</title>
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      <description>An indexed web page can carry a natural-language payload that targets, in a few lines, all four defensive layers of an AI agent: evasion, persistence, exfiltration, concealment. Worse, the outbound channel used for exfiltration is bidirectional: behind the URL, an attacker talks to the agent in real time. This article details the mechanism, shows why warning the model is a necessary but never sufficient first line, and why security comes from architecture — not from the prompt.</description>
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